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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 2004, Sherman Maxwell, who was doing business as Von Zippers Custom
Cycles, entered into a joint venture with Small Block Enterprises, Inc. Under the parties'
agreement, they would purchase, repair/refurbish, and re-sell all manner of vehicles
(automobiles, pickup trucks, and watercraft), splitting the profits on a 50/50 basis. They
also had one project where they built a motorcycle from the ground up, with the intent of
selling it for a profit (again, to be split on a 50/50 basis). Generally speaking, Small
Block was the "money" partner, buying totaled vehicles and/or purchasing the
necessary parts, and Von Zippers was the "expertise" partner, doing all the actual work.
Unfortunately, the business relationship between Von Zippers and Small Block
fell apart after only a few months. After Mr. Maxwell sold the motorcycle he had been
building with Small Block (which happened to have a motor whose "motor number," i.e.,
serial number, had apparently been gouged out) and failed to share the proceeds with
Small Block, he was charged with three felonies: grand theft of the motorcycle;
defacing, destroying, or obliterating a motor number; and knowingly selling a vehicle
whose motor number has been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. Following a jury trial,
Mr. Maxwell was found guilty of all three felonies, received a suspended sentence and
was placed on probation, and was ordered to pay restitution.
On appeal, Mr. Maxwell presents three claims of error: (1) there is insufficient
evidence to support the grand theft conviction because the trial evidence showed that
he was a co-owner of the motorcycle; (2) the indictment was improperly amended to
allege different offenses (stemming from the defaced, destroyed, or obliterated motor
number) than had been considered by the grand jury; and (3) even if the grand theft
1

conviction can properly stand, the restitution award stemming from that count was
improperly calculated. Mr. Maxwell requests that this Court vacate his convictions and
sentences and order an acquittal on the grand theft charge and a dismissal of the other
two charges. Alternatively, he requests that the restitution amount awarded to National
Indemnity Company (Small Block's insurer) be reduced by $5,000.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Sherman "Sonny" Maxwell appears to be quite adept at building and repairing all
things mechanical. (See 2007 PSI, pp.7-8.) 1 For a time, he owned and operated a very
successful boat repair, maintenance, and transport company; upon moving to Idaho in
1993, he owned an auto body business (Black Hawk Auto Body), which he ran for
approximately eight years; and, in 2001, he started a custom motorcycle business (Von
Zippers Custom Cycles), whereby he not only worked on motorcycles, but also
continued working on automobiles. (2006 PSI, pp.7-8; 2007 PSI, pp.7-8; Tr. Vol. VI,
p.335, Ls.1-10. 2)

There were two pre-sentence investigation reports prepared in this case. The first,
filed with the district court on June 12, 2006 (hereinafter, 2006 PSI), was created in
anticipation of a June 21, 2006 sentencing hearing; however, because the district court
apparently rejected the parties' proposed plea agreement (see Tr. Vol. II, p.149, L.19 p.150, L.10), Mr. Maxwell's case instead proceeded to trial. Therefore, an updated
report was filed on May 24, 2007 (hereinafter, 2007 PSI), in anticipation of
Mr. Maxwell's July 20, 2007 sentencing hearing (which was continued to August 17,
2007 (see R., pp.318-20)).
2 There are a number of separately-bound volumes of transcripts in the record on
appeal in this case. The volume containing the transcript of the April 7, 2005 grand jury
proceedings is referenced herein as "Tr. Vol. I"; the volume containing transcripts of a
host of pretrial hearings (held January 5, 2006, March 21, 2006, May 4, 2006, June 21,
2006, September 7, 2006, and July 10, 2007), as well as the transcript of Mr. Maxwell's
August 17, 2007 sentencing hearing), is referenced herein, as "Tr. Vol. II"; the volume
containing a transcript of the non-evidentiary portion (e.g., jury instruction conference,
discussion of Mr. Maxwell's motion in limine, and opening statements) of the first day
(April 9, 2007) of Mr. Maxwell's trial is referenced as "Tr. Vol. Ill"; the volume containing
a transcript of the evidentiary portion (the testimony of James Witherspoon) of the first
2
1

In early 2004, Mr. Maxwell met James Witherspoon. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.335, L 1
- p.336, L.15.)

Mr. Witherspoon is a home remodeler who operated his home

remodeling business, Witherspoon Homes, Inc., as well as a "side" or "hobby" business,
Small Block Enterprises, Inc., a car renovation business. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.5, Ls.2-22; Tr.
Vol. VI, p.38, Ls.4-8.) Also involved in both of these businesses was Mr. Witherspoon's
wife, Diana Witherspoon. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.48, Ls.2-8.)
Apparently, the Witherspoons did not conduct much (or any) business through
Small Block until they met Mr. Maxwell in early 2004. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.49, L.21 p.50, L.11.)

In March of that year though, Mr. Maxwell (through Von Zippers) and

Mr. Witherspoon (through Small Block) entered into an arrangement whereby Small
Block would put up the money to purchase "totaled" cars and the parts needed to fix
them, Von Zippers would repair and refurbish the vehicles, and the parties would then
split the profits upon sale of the repaired/refurbished cars. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.336, Ls.16-21,
p.340, Ls.7-12; see Tr. Vol. VI, p.131, L.2- p.138, L.24 (Mrs. Witherspoon testifying as
to the business relationship generally); see also Tr. Vol. IV, p. 7, L.18 - p.9, L.6
(Mr. Witherspoon discussing the agreement as to the first project undertaken by the Von
Zippers/Small Block joint venture).)

Unfortunately, no written contract was ever

executed to memorialize the terms of the overall arrangement, or any of the individual

day (April 9, 2007) of Mr. Maxwell's trial is referenced as "Tr. Vol. IV"; the volume
containing a transcript of the hearing on the State's motion in limine on the morning of
the second day (April 10, 2007) of Mr. Maxwell's trial is referenced as "Tr. Vol. V"; the
volume containing a transcript of the balance of Mr. Maxwell's trial, i.e., most of the
proceedings held on the second day of trial, April 10, 2007, and all of the proceedings
held on April 11 and 12, 2007, is referenced as "Tr. Vol. VI"; the volume containing a
transcript of the restitution hearing held on December 13, 2007, is referenced as
'Tr. Vol. VII"; and the volume containing transcripts of the remaining post-trial hearings
on the matter of restitution and Mr. Maxwell's motion for a new trial (April 22, 2008,
February 9, 2010, August 11, 2010, November 5, 2010, and January 21, 2011) are
referenced as "Tr. Vol. VIII."
3

projects undertaken as part of this arrangement. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.23, Ls.5-8; Tr. Vol. VI,
p.138, Ls.8-16.)
As it turns out, Von Zippers and Small Block initiated many projects over the
approximately four months of their venture. It appears these projects included at least
four pickup trucks, three automobiles, two watercraft, and one motorcycle. (See Ex. T.)
With regard to the motorcycle project, 3 which is at issue in this case, the
agreement was largely the same as for all of the other projects that were part of the Von
Zippers/Small Block joint venture, except that Mr. Maxwell was going to build the
motorcycle from the ground up. Specifically, the deal was that Von Zippers was going
to contribute certain parts, Small Block was going to purchase the rest of the necessary
parts, Von Zippers (Mr. Maxwell) was going to build the bike, and Von Zippers and
Small Block were going to sell the bike and split the profits 50/50. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.38 (Mr. Witherspoon's testimony), p.9, Ls.2-8 (same), p.23, Ls.5-15 (same); Tr. Vol. VI,
p.347, Ls.11-25 (Mr. Maxwell's testimony), p.373, Ls.11-17(same), p.401, L.17-p.402,
L.6 (same), 408, Ls.2-9 (same).) 4 In furtherance of this project, Small Block paid for a

There appears to be conflicting testimony as to when the motorcycle project was
initiated. According to Mr. Witherspoon, the motorcycle was the very first project on
which Von Zippers and Small Block collaborated. (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.7, L.18 - p.9, L.1.)
However, Mr. Maxwell testified that the motorcycle project did not come into being until
May or early June 2004 (Tr. Vol. VI, p.347, Ls.11-15), which would have been well into
the Von Zippers/Small Block joint venture.
4 Throughout this case, Mrs. Witherspoon has attempted to characterize the agreement
with regard to the motorcycle very differently. She testified before the grand jury that
Mr. Maxwell was going to build a bike for the Witherspoons and, under the agreement,
they (the Witherspoons) would: pay for most of the parts; reimburse Mr. Maxwell for the
parts he contributed; pay Mr. Maxwell for his labor; and, when completed, take
ownership of the bike. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, L.15 - p.14, L.6.) She made a similar claim at
Mr. Maxwell's trial (Tr. Vol. VI, p.53, Ls.19-22, p.55, Ls.5-8, p.84, Ls.3-11 ), and at a
restitution hearing (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.62, Ls.21-23.) However, Mrs. Witherspoon's
testimony in this regard has proven untrue. At trial, she conceded that she was not
involved in the formation of the agreement regarding the motorcycle, as those
discussions were between her husband and Mr. Maxwell (Tr. Vol. VI, p.52, Ls.8-17
3
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(admitting that she "was not particularly involved in the discussions about building the
motorcycle," and that her understanding of the deal struck was based on conversations
from her husband), p.63, Ls.10-13 (conceding that "this was more of Mr. Witherspoon
and Mr. Maxwell's project," and that she "was one on the outside."), so her
characterizations of the contract could not have been based on firsthand knowledge.
Moreover, the only State's witness who did have firsthand knowledge of the terms of the
contract, Mr. Witherspoon, testified that the agreement was for Von Zippers to
contribute certain parts, Small Block to purchase the rest of the necessary parts,
Von Zippers to build the bike, and Von Zippers and Small Block to sell the bike and split
the profits 50/50. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-8, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.23, Ls.5-15.)
Mrs. Witherspoon further testified before the grand jury that, when the bike was
nearly complete, it was titled in the Witherspoons' names, and a "final payment" of
$5,000 was made to Mr. Maxwell on the bike. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.18-25, p.13, L 12 p.14, L.8.) At trial, although she continued to claim that the $5,000 check given to
Mr. Maxwell was a payment for the parts and labor he contributed to the motorcycle
project, and she continued to assert that the deal was for the Witherspoon's to pay for
and take ownership of the bike, she now characterized the $5,000 payment as a
"prepayment" and explained that "[nJot all the work was done, but we were giving him
money ahead and just kind of securing it by a note, because if he didn't finish the bike,
we wanted the money back. It was just sort of a silly way of getting it secured, I guess."
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.53, L.25 - p.54, L21; see also Tr. Vol. VI, p.61, L.20 - p.62, L.1 (testifying
that she was "pretty sure" that the $5,000 check given to Mr. Maxwell was intended to
be payment for the motorcycle).) As it turns out though, Ms. Witherspoon's testimony in
this regard turned out to be demonstrably false as well, as the $5,000 payment was only
tangentially related to the motorcycle project. Mr. Witherspoon testified that he was the
one who made the $5,000 payment to Mr. Maxwell, and that this payment was a loan
made to Mr. Maxwell because Mr. Maxwell was behind on his bills. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.14,
L.21 - p.15, L.4, p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.1; Tr. Vol. VI, p.44, Ls.22-24; see also Tr. Vol. VI,
p.62, Ls.17-19 (Mrs. Witherspoon admitting she was not present for the discussions
between Mr. Witherspoon and Mr. Maxwell concerning the agreement for the $5,000
payment).) Indeed, the check itself was drawn on the account of Witherspoon Homes,
Inc., not Small Block or the Witherspoons personally (see Plaintiff's Ex. 4; Tr. Vol. IV,
p.41, Ls.4-11); it was secured by a promissory note making no mention of a motorcycle
and requiring repayment within one year (see Defendant's Ex. F); and the
Witherspoons' letter demanding repayment of the note made no mention of any
motorcycle (see Defendant's Ex. U). Indeed, Mr. Witherspoon testified that the $5,000
loan was not specifically tied to the motorcycle. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.43, L. 7 - p.45, L.12.)
Thus, the only relationship this loan had to the motorcycle project, it seems, was that
when Mr. Witherspoon made the loan, he anticipated that Mr. Maxwell could repay it out
of his share of the profits on the sale of the bike. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.15, Ls.5-8, p.38, L.8 p.39, L.17; see also Tr. Vol. VI, p.33, L.12-p.34, L.17 (Mr. Witherspoon testifying that
he felt that the motorcycle would be his "security" on the $5,000 loan).) In fact,
Mr. Witherspoon testified that Mr. Maxwell eventually signed title to the motorcycle over
to the Witherspoons as security on the note. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.20, Ls.2-13; Tr. Vol. VI,
p.35, Ls.1-19.)
It is notable that, in its post-trial briefing in this case, the State conceded the
agreements in question are as stated herein. (See State's Response to Defendant's
5

Harley Davidson motor (and certain other parts), and Von Zippers contributed a frame
and (and certain other parts). (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.9, L.21 - p.13, L.1 (Mr. Witherspoon
testifying that he purchased the motor for approximately $3500, and made a separate
$2,300+ purchase of miscellaneous parts), p.16, L.19 - p.27, L.8 (Mr. Witherspoon
testifying that he paid for the ignition, while Mr. Maxwell supplied the frame, the wheels,
the transmission, and the starter), p.66, Ls.14-15 (Mrs. Witherspoon testifying that she
and her husband purchased the engine).)
It was not long before the business relationship soured.

According to Mr.

Maxwell, after Small Block purchased the first two vehicles, Mrs. Witherspoon came into
the picture and put a strain on the relationship: "[S]he was real excited and wanted to go
to the auction.

So all of a sudden every week [they] were at the auction and she's

buying more and more cars."

(Tr. Vol. VI. p.339, L.23 - p.341, L.1.) According to

Mr. Maxwell, he had so many projects going with Small Block that were taking up all of
his time; unfortunately, because the Witherspoons did not want to sell anything, for
months he had no money coming in. (Tr., p.340, L.18 - p.342, L.5, p.344, L.4 - p.345,
L.5, p.346, L.16 - p.347, L.7, p.381, Ls.15-23.) As a result, Mr. Maxwell testified, he
twice had to borrow money from the Witherspoons-once for $1,500, and once for
$5,000. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.342, L.2 - p.346, L.15; Ex. C (promissory note for the $1,500
loan, dated April 15, 2004); Ex. F (promissory note for the $5,000 loan, dated May 17,
2004). 5)

Motion for New Trial and Supporting Brief, pp.4-6 (May 6, 2010) (attached to motion to
augment record filed contemporaneously herewith).)
5 The promissory note that is Exhibit F relates to the same $5,000 loan discussed in
note 4, supra. As discussed above, Mrs. Witherspoon tried to characterize this loan as
the Witherspoons' payment on the motorcycle.
6

Even though he was borrowing money from the Witherspoons to keep his
business and himself afloat, Mr. Maxwell apparently still felt that Small Block and Von
Zippers should be selling some of their jointly-owned vehicles. Thus, in June of 2004,
he took two vehicles to California to sell at auction to raise some money. (Tr. Vol. VI,
p.366, L.24 - p.367, L.20.)

According to Mr. Maxwell, this did not sit well with

Mrs. Witherspoon. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.367, Ls.5-6.) He contends that while he was away,
the Witherspoons came to his place of business and took all of the vehicles, except
those (such as the motorcycle) that were locked inside his shop. 6 (See Tr. Vol. VI,
p.367, Ls.2-19.)
Believing that the Witherspoons were selling the joint venture's property without
sharing the proceeds with him, Mr. Maxwell felt "all bets were off." (See Tr. Vol. VI,
p.408, Ls.10-13.) Thus, in August of 2004, Mr. Maxwell sold the unfinished motorcycle 7
to a third party, Phil Neff, through eBay. 8 (Tr. Vol. VI, p.374, L.18 - p.375, L.15.) He
testified that he sold it at that time partly because he needed some income, and partly

The Witherspoons did not testify as to these matters in the State's case-in-chief. (See
generally Tr. Vol. IV, p.4, L.12 - p.44, L.6 (testimony of James Witherspoon); Tr. Vol. VI,
p.29, L.14 - p.46, L.22 (same), p.47, L.8 - p.164, L.2.) Nor did they testify in rebuttal.
(See Tr. Vol. VI, p.421, L.12-14.)
7 Throughout this case, there has been uncertainty as to whether the bike sold to
Mr. Neff was the same bike Mr. Maxwell built as part of his joint venture with Small
Block, whether it was constructed out of some or most of the parts from the bike built
with Small Block, or whether it was a completely separate bike altogether. Ultimately,
Mr. Maxwell testified that the bike sold to Mr. Neff was the same bike that had been built
with Small Block. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.393, Ls.18-24.) However, this testimony does not
answer the question of whether certain parts may have been swapped out at some
roint.
Mr. Neff was unable to title the motorcycle because part of the motor number had
been gouged out. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.182, L.10 - p.187, L.16.) At trial, Mr. Maxwell
denied any knowledge of the motor number having been altered or defaced in any way.
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.365, Ls.4-8.)
6

7

because he needed to pay off the suppliers of the parts he contributed to that bike.
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.374, L.22 - p.375, L.9, p.393, Ls.21-24.)
The

Witherspoons

told

a

very

different

story

about

the

motorcycle.

Mr. Witherspoon testified that, around the time that the bike was titled in their names
(April 2004 (see Ex.5)), they took possession of it. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.17, L.23 - p.19, L.9.)
He further testified that they relinquished physical possession back to Mr. Maxwell in
late May or early June so he could do additional work on it. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, L.10 p.20, L.3, p.23, L.21 -

p.24, L.11.)

However, instead of finishing the bike,

Mr. Witherspoon claimed after dragging his feet initially, Mr. Maxwell began stripping the
bike down, leaving them with the feeling that Mr. Maxwell was not going to complete it.
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.25, L.13 - p.28, L.2.) As a result, around July 5, 2004, the Witherspoons
tried to get the police involved; however, the police refused to intervene. (Tr. Vol. VI,
p.28, L.12 - p.29, L.10.)
Regardless of whose version of events is believed, it is undisputed that as the
parties' relationship deteriorated, but before any motorcycle was sold to Mr. Neff,
Mr. Maxwell attempted to wind up Von Zipper's business relationship with Small Block.
In early July, shortly after the Witherspoons presented him with a proposed business
plan, Mr. Maxwell responded with a letter.

In the letter, Mr. Maxwell rejected the

proposed plan as an attempt to retrospectively alter the original agreement, expressed
an interest in terminating the joint venture between Von Zippers and Small Block, and
proposed a split of the assets still held by the joint venture. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.368, L.8
- p.370, L.7; Ex. Q; Ex. S.) Two days later, the Witherspoons agreed to terminate the
joint venture but rejected Mr. Maxwell's split of the joint assets; the Witherspoons
wanted to keep all of the vehicles and simply pay Mr. Maxwell for his work on them.

8

(See Tr. Vol. VI, p.369, L.10 - p.370, L. 7; Ex. T.) As it turned out, these negotiations
were not fruitful (Tr. Vol. VI, p.369, L.20 - p.370, L.11, p.408, L.20 - p.409, L.2) and the
parties' relationship went from bad to worse. 9
On April 7, 2005, the State took the matter to a Kootenai County grand jury,
seeking indictments for: one count of grand theft (for stealing the motorcycle from the
Witherspoons); one count of defacing, destroying, or obliterating a vehicle identification
number (VIN) 10 (on the motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff); and one count of knowingly
disposing of, selling, or offering for sale a vehicle (the motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff)
whose VIN had been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.1-9.) Based
on Mrs. Witherspoon's claim that she and her husband had purchased the motorcycle
from Mr. Maxwell (see note 4, supra (detailing Mrs. Witherspoon's false testimony in this
regard)), 11 the grand jury indicted Mr. Maxwell on the grand theft charge. (See R., 1314.)

In addition, although the only competent evidence presented showed that the

motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff had a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated motor number, not
a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated VIN (see Tr. Vol. I, p.75, Ls.7-19, p.76, L.11-p.78,

It appears that it was just a couple days after Mr. Maxwell rejected the Witherspoons'
proposed business plan that the Witherspoons brought the police to his shop in an effort
to compel him to turn over the motorcycle to them. (Compare Ex. S (Mr. Maxwell's
letter, dated July 1, 2004) with Tr. Vol. IV, p.28, L. 12 (Mr. Witherspoon testifying that he
and his wife brought the police to Mr. Maxwell's shop on "July 5th or something like that,
about the first week in July").)
10 It is undisputed that a VIN, which is based on the serial number appearing on the
frame of the motorcycle, is distinct from a "motor number," which is the serial number
appearing on the engine of the motorcycle. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.72, L.17 - p.73, L.10
(Patricia Redel's grand jury testimony); Tr. Vol. VI, p.235, L.25 - p.237, L.3 (Ms. Redel's
trial testimony).)
11 Because Mr. Witherspoon did not testify (see generally Tr. Vol. I), and because
Mrs. Witherspoon never let the grand jury know that she did not have personal
knowledge of the terms of agreement with regard to the motorcycle (see generally
Tr. Vol. I, p.6, L.19 - p.44, L.10), the grand jury could not have known that the building
of the motorcycle was a joint project between Von Zippers and Small Block and, thus,
the Witherspoons were not the outright owners of that motorcycle.
9

9

L.5 (testimony of Patricia Redel, a motor vehicle inspector with the Idaho Department of
Transportation)), 12 the grand jury nevertheless indicted Mr. Maxwell on the other
charges of defacing, destroying, or obliterating a VIN and disposing of, selling, or
offering for sale a vehicle whose VIN had been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. (See
R., pp.14-15.)
On May 10, 2005, Mr. Maxwell filed a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment
based on insufficient evidence having been presented to the grand jury. (R., p.22; see
also R., pp.51-59 (memorandum in support of motion to dismiss).) Mr. Maxwell argued,
inter alia, that the two counts relating to the supposedly defaced, destroyed, or

obliterated VIN must be dismissed because the evidence showed only that a motor
number may have been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated, not the motorcycle VIN.
(R., p.56.)

Ms. Redel, whose job it is to inspect vehicles (including motorcycles) for purposes of
titling and registering them (Tr. Vol. I, p.71, L.21 - p.72, L.16), testified that the bike had
a valid VIN on its frame, and that it did not appear that VIN had been altered in any way
(Tr. Vol. I, p.75, Ls.16-18, p.76, Ls.13-15); however, she then explained that she
observed the motor number appeared to have been gouged out (Tr. Vol. I, p.77, L.7 p. 78, L.5). Dacia Turner, a police detective with less than four years' experience as a
police officer (Tr. Vol. I, p.120, L.21 - p.121, L.5), confirmed that the bike had an intact
VIN on the frame (Tr. Vol. I, p.128, Ls.18-24), and the motor number had been
scratched out (Tr. Vol. I, p.127, L.21 - p.128, L.4); however, she also testified there was
a spot on the frame, assuming it had previously borne a sticker with a different, or
perhaps second VIN on it, that sticker appeared to have been scratched off. (See
Tr. Vol. I, p.126, L.20 - p.127, L.15.) Mr. Maxwell submits this last bit of testimony was
not probative, as it rested on the assumption the bike sold to Mr. Neff had the same
frame as the bike Von Zippers built with Small Block (see Tr. Vol. I, p.126, L.22 - p.127,
L.12), but that assumption turned out to be untrue, as the frame on the Neff version of
the bike was manufactured by Santee Industries (see Tr. Vol. I, p.90, L.11 - p.91, L.4),
whereas the frame on the Von Zippers/Small Block version of the bike had a serial
number that was inconsistent with a Santee-manufactured frame (see Tr. Vol. I, p.117,
Ls.1-11, p.118, L.16 - p.119, L.17). Thus, the State later implicitly conceded that the
evidence did not show that the VIN had been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. (See
R., p.95.)
12
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In response, the State implicitly conceded the grand jury testimony supported a
finding only that the motor number was defaced, destroyed, or obliterated, not the VIN.
(See R., pp.93-97.) Specifically, it argued it should be allowed to amend the indictment
to change the allegations (to defacing, destroying, or obliterating a motor number and
disposing of, selling, or offering for sale a vehicle whose motor number has been
defaced, destroyed, or obliterated) to conform to the grand jury testimony (R., pp.9394). The State also claimed these different factual allegations would still make out the
"same offenses" under I.C. § 49-1418, the statute under which Mr. Maxwell was
originally charged (R., p.95).
In his reply memorandum on this issue, Mr. Maxwell objected to any amendment
of the indictment under Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e), 13 arguing the proposed amendment,
although it charged crimes under the same statutory provisions that had originally been
pied, nevertheless alleged different crimes by alleging different operative facts.
(R., pp.122-23; see also Tr. Vol. II, p.44, Ls.19-25 (defense counsel's reiteration of this
argument at the hearing on Mr. Maxwell's motion to dismiss).)
Ultimately, the district court concluded "[t]he Indictment is clearly wrong" (Tr. Vol.
II, p.51, Ls.14-15), but it found because the different acts alleged in the State's
proposed amended indictment would not charge a different offense, the State could file
an amended indictment. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.49, L.21 - p.52, L.9.) Thus, on March 24, 2006,
the State filed a Second Amended lndictment 14 alleging that Mr. Maxwell had defaced,

Under Rule 7, the State may be permitted to amend a complaint, information, or
indictment "at any time before the prosecution rests if no additional or different offense
is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." I.C.R. 7(e)
~emphasis added).
4 Although entitled a Second Amended Indictment, this was actually the only amended
indictment actually filed. (See generally R.) The State had apparently prepared an
amended indictment for purposes of the March 21, 2006 hearing on Mr. Maxwell's
13

11

destroyed, or obliterated a motor number, and that he had knowingly disposed of, sold,
or offered for sale a vehicle whose motor number had been defaced, destroyed, or
obliterated. (R., pp.128-30.)
On January 16, 2007, Mr. Maxwell filed a motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Indictment. (R., p.168; see also R., pp.170-75 (memorandum in support of
motion to dismiss).) He argued that the Second Amended Indictment was inadequate
under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions because, in Counts II & 111 (the
two counts revolving around the alleged defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the
motor number), it alleged different crimes than those that had been passed upon by the
grand jury. (R., pp.170-75.) Specifically, he argued that the facts alleged in the original
charging document, not the designation of the offense, define the crime and, therefore,
when the State amended the indictment to allege different operative facts, even though
the State continued to allege violations of the same statutory provisions, it nevertheless
charged different offenses. (R., pp.173-74.)
On March 20, 2007, the district court entered a written order denying
Mr. Maxwell's motion. (R., pp.215-16.) The district court offered three reasons therefor.
First, it reasoned that Mr. Maxwell's motion presented "the same issues by a different
defense attorney to a different district judge . . . . The issues have already been
properly decided."

(R., p.215.)

Second, it found that Mr. Maxwell's motion was

"procedurally tardy" under Idaho Criminal Rule 12.

(R., pp.215, 216.)

Third, it

motion to dismiss; however, it did not file that original amended indictment because the
district court requested additional changes (narrowing the time frame alleged in Count
Ill (selling or offering for sale a vehicle with a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated motor
number)). (See Tr. Vol. 11, p.52, L.10 - p.54, L.10.) The district court then requested
the State simply file one amended indictment reflecting all of the appropriate changes
(Tr. Vol. II, p.54, Ls.21-25), and the State did that; however, it still called it a "second"
amended indictment.
12

concluded that, under Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e), the motion was "without substantive
merit because no new offense is charged [in the Second Amended Indictment] and the
defendant has not shown any prejudice." (R., p.216.)
Mr. Maxwell's four-day trial began on April 9, 2007. (See generally R., pp.219311.) At trial, Mr. Witherspoon testified that the agreement between Von Zippers and
Small Block was for the two of them to construct a motorcycle and split the profits from
the sale of that bike. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-8, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.23, Ls.5-15.) He further
testified as to the $5,000 loan made to Mr. Maxwell, and the fact the loan was only
tangentially related to the motorcycle. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.4, p.15, L.21 p.16, L.1; Tr. Vol. VI, p.44, Ls.22-24.) Mrs. Witherspoon also testified. (See generally
Tr. Vol. VI, p.47, L.8 - p.164, L.2.) As discussed above, although she attempted to
characterize the deal regarding the motorcycle as a purchase of the bike (Tr. Vol. VI,
p.53, Ls.19-22, p.55, Ls.5-8, p.84, Ls.3-11 ), she ultimately conceded she was not a
party to the negotiation of that agreement or the subsequent $5,000 loan. (Tr. Vol. VI,
p.52, Ls.8-17, p.62, Ls.17-19, p.63, Ls.10-13.)
With regard to the charges concerning the allegedly defaced, destroyed, or
obliterated motor number, Mr. Neff testified at trial concerning his purchase of a
motorcycle from Mr. Maxwell (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.172, L.8 -

p.174, L.13), his

unsuccessful attempt to get that motorcycled titled (Tr. Vol. VI, p.186, Ls.7-24), and his
discovery of the fact that the motor number appeared to have been gouged out (see
Tr. Vol. VI, p.187, L.15 - p.188, L.6).

Ms. Redel testified concerning her own

observations with regard to the motor number, and explained why she could not provide
title to Mr. Neff. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.237, L.22 - p.245, L.2.)
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Finally, Mr. Maxwell exercised his right to testify. He confirmed Mr. Witherspoon's
testimony with regard to the nature of the agreements concerning the motorcycle (see
Tr. Vol. VI, p.336, L16 - p.340, L.15, p.357, Ls.19-24, p.373, Ls.11-17, p.401, L.17 p.402, L.10) and the $5,000 loan (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.342, L.2 - p.346, L.15). With regard
to the motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff, Mr. Maxwell denied knowledge of the fact that the
motor number had been gouged out. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.365, L.4 - 366, L.23.)
Following the close of the evidentiary portion of Mr. Maxwell's trial, the jury was
instructed that, on the grand theft charge, one of the elements it had to find (if it was to
render a guilty verdict on that charge) was that one (or both) of the Witherspoons was
the "owner" of the motorcycle. (Jury Instruction No. 13.) 15 It was further instructed that
"[a]n 'owner' of property is any person who has a right of possession of such property
superior to that of the defendant" (Jury Instruction No. 18); however, it was not told how
to determine whose right of possession was superior in light of the unique business
arrangement between Von Zippers and Small Block. (See generally Jury Instructions.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury came back with guilty verdicts on all three
counts. (R., pp.312-14; Tr. Vol. VI, p.469, L.6 - p.470, L.7.) Ultimately, the district court
imposed an aggregate sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, 16 but suspended
that sentence and placed Mr. Maxwell on probation for seven years. (R., p.338; Tr. Vol.
II, p.152, L.24 - p.153, L.3, p.153, Ls.13-20.) The district court entered its judgment of
conviction on August 28, 2007. (R., pp.337-42.)

15

The jury instructions in this case appear as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record.
This aggregate sentence consisted of concurrent sentences of: seven years, with two
years fixed, for grand theft; and five years, with two years fixed, for each of the two
counts relating to the defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the motor number in the
motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff. (R., p.338.)
16
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The matter of restitution was handled after Mr. Maxwell was sentenced. 17
Around October 5, 2005 (which was approximately six months after Mr. Maxwell was
indicted, but approximately 18 months before his case went to trial), National Indemnity
Company, the insurance company through which Small Block had insured the
motorcycle, paid the Witherspoons $15,044.11 for their purported loss.

(Affidavit of

Scott Kepler in Support of Restitution, p.2 & ex.9 (attached to State's July 29 and
August 5, 2008 Notices of Supporting Documents, which are attached to the motion to
augment record

filed

contemporaneously

herewith).)

Thus,

National

Indemnity

Company sought restitution in that amount. (See 2006 PSI addendum, pp.9-11; 2007
PSI addendum, pp.9-11.) 18 This amount was calculated based on Mrs. Witherspoon's
representations as to what Small Block had paid toward completion of the motorcycle,
including the $5,000 (loan) given to Mr. Maxwell, which Mrs. Witherspoon characterized
as payment on the motorcycle. (See generally Affidavit of Scott Kepler in Support of
Restitution; Tr. Vol. VIII, p.66, L.8 - p.74, L.14.) Ultimately, the district court granted
National Indemnity's full restitution request. 19 ("Amended" Order to Pay Restitution as a

At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted restitution would be ordered, but it
reserved that matter for a later time. (R., p.339; Tr. Vol. II, p.152, Ls.11-17, p.153, Ls.412, p.154, L.1-p.155, L.17.)
18 National Indemnity's restitution requests were sometimes made in the name of Able
Claims Service, Inc. (see, e.g., 2006 PSI addendum, pp.9-11; 2007 PSI addendum,
pp.9-11 ), the firm hired by National Indemnity to adjust Small Block's claim. (See
Tr. Vol. VIII, p.66, Ls.16-25.)
19 The district court also awarded restitution in the amount of $500 to the Witherspoons,
and $519 to Mr. Neff. ("Amended" Order to Pay Restitution as a Condition of Probation
(Jan. 27, 2011 ); "Amended" Civil Judgment (Jan. 27, 2011 ).) These amounts are not
discussed in detail herein because they are not at issue in the present appeal.
Incidentally, Mr. Neff apparently wound up with the motorcycle. (See R., pp.364-65
(interim (partial) restitution order requiring, inter a/ia, that Mr. Maxwell and National
Indemnity execute the documents necessary for relinquishing all claims they might have
had to ownership in the motorcycle, and that the Idaho Department of Transportation
issue title in Mr. Neffs name).)
17
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Condition of Probation (Jan. 27, 2011) (attached to motion to augment record filed
contemporaneously herewith); "Amended" Civil Judgment (Jan. 27, 2011) (attached to
motion to augment record filed contemporaneously herewith); Tr. Vol. VIII, p.94, Ls.611.)
Mr. Maxwell also filed a motion for a new trial which, although filed prior to his
sentencing, was briefed, argued, and decided afterward.

While Mr. Maxwell is not

challenging the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial because he is
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on the same basis, it is worth noting the
basis for that motion: the grand theft conviction cannot stand because the evidence at
trial showed the Witherspoons did not have a superior possessory right to the
motorcycle which was actually jointly-owned by Small Block and Von Zippers.
(R., pp.321-25; Memorandum in Support of l\/1otion for New Trial (Mar. 30, 2010)
(attached to motion to augment record filed contemporaneously herewith); Tr. Vol. VIII,
p.49, Ls.12-19). The district court disagreed, concluding there was sufficient evidence
to support the conviction because the "Witherspoons had full title and possession" of the
motorcycle, and it therefore denied Mr. Maxwell's motion for a new trial. (Tr. Vol. VIII,
p.54, Ls.11-24; accord Order (Aug. 27, 2010) (attached to motion to augment record
filed contemporaneously herewith).)
In the meantime, Mr. Maxwell filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.345-47.) On
appeal, Mr. Maxwell asserts three claims of error: (1) there was insufficient evidence to
support his grand theft conviction; (2) the indictment was improperly amended to allege
different offenses (related to the defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the motor
number) than had been considered by the grand jury; and (3) the district court erred in
its computation of the restitution owed to National Indemnity.
16

ISSUES
1.

Was sufficient evidence offered at Mr. Maxwell's trial to sustain his conviction for
grand theft?

2.

Did the district court err in allowing the State to amend the indictment to allege
different offenses than those considered by the grand jury?

3.

Did the district court err in its computation of the restitution owed to National
Indemnity?

17

ARGUMENT
I.
There Was Insufficient Evidence Offered At Trial To Sustain Mr. Maxwell's Conviction
For Grand Theft
A.

Introduction
Mr. Maxwell contends that there is insufficient evidence to support his grand theft

conviction because the State failed to offer substantial, competent evidence as to one of
the essential elements of that offense-that James and Diana Witherspoon were
"owners" of the motorcycle he was alleged to have stolen.

Specifically, he contends

that because the term "owner," as used within the theft statute (I.C. § 18-2403(1 )), is
defined as someone having "a right of possession ... superior to that of the taker,
obtainer or withholder," I.C. § 18-2402(6) (emphasis added), and the trial evidence
clearly indicated that Mr. Maxwell had an equal right of possession to the motorcycle he
is alleged to have stolen, he cannot be said to have committed a theft.
B.

Applicable Legal Standards
A criminal conviction may be set aside if the State failed to present substantial,

competent evidence upon which a rational jury could have found the essential elements
of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724

(2007). In determining whether such substantial, competent evidence is present in the
record, the appellate court will view all facts in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict. Id.
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C.

The State Failed To Offer SubstantiaL Competent Evidence Showing That
Mr. Maxwell Took, Obtained, Or Withheld The Motorcycle From The "Owner'
In order to obtain a conviction on the grand theft charge in this case, the State

had to prove the following four essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1)

Sherman Maxwell wrongfully took, obtained or withheld property, i.e., a
specific motorcycle;

2)

He took, obtained or withheld the motorcycle with the intent to deprive
another of that motorcycle, or to appropriate it for himself or a third person;

3)

The motorcycle was taken, obtained or withheld from its "owner," i.e., one
or both of the Witherspoons; and

4)

The value of the motorcycle was greater than $1,000.

See I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), I.C. §§ 18-2407(1)(b)(1).

Amended Indictment); Jury Instruction No. 13.)

(See also R., pp.128-30 (Second

With regard to the third of these

essential elements-the requirement that the motorcycle have been taken, obtained or
withheld from an "owner"-the term "owner" is defined as "any person who has a right to
possession [of the motorcycle] superior to that of' Mr. Maxwell. I.C. § 18-2402(6). (See
also Jury Instruction No.18.)

Thus, not only did the State have to prove that

Mr. Maxwell took, obtained or withheld the motorcycle from the Witherspoons, but it also
had to prove that the Witherspoons had right of possession of the motorcycle that was
superior to Mr. Maxwell's. See I.C. § 18-2402(6). Mr. Maxwell contends that the State
failed in this regard.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently had occasion to discuss the "ownership"
element of the crime of theft. See State v. Bennett, 150 Idaho 278 (2010). In Bennett,
the Supreme Court noted the term "owner" is defined in terms of a superior right of
possession under Idaho's theft statute, but it implicitly recognized determining who has
19

a superior right of possession is not always easy, and may even require resort to
principles more commonly invoked in civil litigation. See id. at 280. The Bennett Court
examined the facts in view of Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (codified
at Chapters 2 and 9 of Title 28 of the Idaho Code), and determined the State had failed
to prove the alleged victim's right of possession was superior to that of the defendant. 20
Id.

While the present case is not precisely the same as Bennett, the Bennett opinion
is nevertheless instructive because it makes it clear where a defendant charged with
theft based on taking, obtaining, or withholding property from another also has a right of
possession of that property, other areas of the law must be considered in order to
determine whose right of possession was superior.

For the following reasons,

Mr. Maxwell contends that his right of possession of the motorcycle at issue in this case
was at least equal to that of the Witherspoons.
1.

There Is No Competent Evidence To Suggest That Mr. Maxwell Ever Sold
The Motorcycle To The Witherspoons

As discussed in the above statement of facts, although Mrs. Witherspoon has, at
times, claimed that she and her husband purchased the motorcycle from Mr. Maxwell
her testimony in this regard is demonstrably false. (See note 4, supra.) At trial, she

20

In Bennett, the defendant had put a down payment (and made at least one additional
payment) on a travel trailer, the travel trailer was delivered to the defendant (at a third
party's property), and the State's evidence indicated that the travel trailer was chained
up (at the third party's property) and not to be moved pending full payment and transfer
of title. Bennett, 150 Idaho at 278-79. When the defendant moved the trailer, he was
charged with grand theft. Id. at 279. The Court held under the UCC, the seller of the
travel trailer no longer had a superior right of possession because he had delivered the
item sold, and because he had failed to effectuate an enforceable security interest in the
trailer (which may have given him a superior right of possession in the event of a default
by the buyer) before the defendant breached the sales contract.
20

conceded that she was not involved in the formation of the agreements with regard to
either the building of the motorcycle (Tr. Vol. VI, p.52, Ls.8-17, p.63, Ls.10-13) or the
$5,000 payment that was made to Von Zippers by Witherspoon Homes (Tr. Vol. VI,
p.62, Ls.17-19), so her beliefs as to the terms of those agreements are based on
nothing more than speculation and, as such, are largely irrelevant. Furthermore, her
husband and business partner, who she conceded actually negotiated with Mr. Maxwell,
clearly and unequivocally testified the agreement was for Von Zippers to contribute
certain parts, Small Block to purchase the rest of the necessary parts, Von Zippers to
build the bike, and Von Zippers and Small Block to sell the bike and split the profits
50/50 (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-8, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.23, Ls.5-15), while the agreement with
regard to the $5,000 payment was a separate loan (Tr. Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.4,
p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.1; Tr. Vol. VI, p.44, Ls.22-24). Clearly these agreements were not
contracts for a sale of a motorcycle. Accordingly, is no surprise the State has since
conceded the Witherspoons did not have a superior right of possession based on a
purchase of the motorcycle.

(See State's Response to Defendant's Motion for New

Trial and Supporting Brief, pp.4-6 (May 6, 2010).)
2.

Insofar As The Motorcycle Was Titled In The Names Of The Witherspoons
And/Or Small Block, That Fact Would Not Be Dispositive Of The Question
Of Who The "Owner" Of The Motorcycle Was For Purposes Of Idaho's
Theft Statute

At trial, there was conflicting testimony as to whether the Witherspoons and/or
Small Block held valid title to the motorcycle. (Compare Tr. Vol. IV, p.17, L.23 - p.18,
L.25, p.20, Ls.4-13, p.38, Ls.4-18 (Mr. Witherspoon claiming that Mr. Maxwell voluntarily
signed a bill of sale, as well as a certificate of title, so that the motorcycle could be titled
in the Witherspoons' names) and Tr. Vol. VI., p.32, L.9 - p.33, L.9, p.35, Ls.1-22, p.37,
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L.19 - p.38, L.17, p.39, L.6 - p.40, L.9 (same) with Tr. Vol. VI, p.357, Ls.7-24, p.358,
Ls.19-23, p.364, Ls.4-13 (Mr. Maxwell denying that he ever signed a bill of sale or
certificate of title to have the motorcycle titled in the Witherspoons' names, and
hypothesizing that the Witherspoons forged the documents necessary to title the
motorcycles in their names).)
Assuming the State's evidence (Mr. Witherspoon's testimony) is true, 21 the title
alone is not dispositive. In Bennett, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the notion that
title controls. There, the Court held the purchaser of a travel trailer had a superior right
of possession and, thus, was the "owner," of that trailer for purposes of Idaho's theft
statute even though the seller had retained title. See Bennett, 150 Idaho at 278-79. 22
As noted above, the Court looked solely to the Uniform Commercial Code to determine
who the owner of the travel trailer was. 23

See id. at 280.

Thus, in this case, the

question is not simply whether the Witherspoons or Small Block could come forward
with title documents for the motorcycle but whether, under Idaho law, they actually had
a superior right of possession.

For the reasons set forth in the following subsection,

Mr. Maxwell contends that they did not.

As noted above, in the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the State. Oliver, 144 Idaho
at 724.
22 Cf. Murgoitio v. Murgoitio, 111 Idaho 573, 576-77 (1986) (affirming a district court's
conclusion that parcels of real property were all owned by a family partnership, even
though title to individual parcels was, at least in some instances, in the names of the
individual family members/ partners).
23 Notably, Justice J. Jones, who wrote separately, indicated that he would have had
decided the case based on the titling provisions of the motor vehicle code, not the UCC.
Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280{ TA \s "Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280" } (Jones, J., concurring).
However, this approach clearly was not embraced by a majority of the Court. See id. at
278-79.
21
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3.

The Evidence In This Case Establishes Von Zippers And Small Block Had
Equal Rights Of Possession To The Motorcycle

As discussed above, Von Zippers and Small Block entered into an agreement
under which they planned to: purchase damaged vehicles, repair or refurbish those
vehicles, and re-sell those vehicles at a profit, splitting the proceeds 50/50. (Tr. Vol. VI,
p.131, L.2 - p.138, L.24, p.336, Ls.16-21, p.340, Ls.7-12.) The agreement called for
Small Block to supply the necessary funds, and Von Zippers the necessary expertise
and labor. (See Tr. VoL VI, p.131, L.2 - p.138, L.24, p.336, Ls.16-21, p.340, Ls.7-12.)
As a slight variation on this broader agreement, at some point they also agreed to build
a custom motorcycle from the ground up. (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.7, L.18 - p.9, L.6.) Again,
the plan was for Small Block to provide the bulk of the funding (although, in this
instance, Von Zippers would contribute certain parts), Von Zippers to supply the knowhow and labor, and the parties to split the profits 50/50. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.7, L.18 - p.9,
L.6.)
Regardless of whether this business relationship is characterized as a joint
venture or a partnership, Mr. Maxwell contends the result is that, under Idaho law, he
and the Witherspoons had equal rights of possession of the motorcycle that was
created through their joint effort and expense. Below, Mr. Maxwell explains why that is
so.

23

a)

Assuming Von Zippers And Small Block Manufactured The
Motorcycle As Part Of A Partnership, They Had Equal Rights Of
Possession Of That Motorcycle

A partnership is an "association of two (2) or more persons 24 to carry on as coowners a business for profit," and it may be formed regardless of the intent of the
parties. I.C. § 53-3-202(a). This definition would seem to fit the business relationship
between Von Zippers and Small Block. There were two parties involved; they
associated with one another; and they did so for the purpose of turning a profit. The
only question is whether they "carr[ied] on as co-owners of a business." 25 Certainly Von
Zippers and Small Block carried on as co-owners of a business involved in repairing /
refurbishing (and selling for a profit) all manner of vehicles; however, the motorcycle
project was somewhat unique in that Von Zippers and Small Block were building the
motorcycle from the ground up. Nevertheless, because the motorcycle project was so
similar in nature to the other projects undertaken by the Von Zippers/Small Block
partnership, it is probably most reasonably construed as part of that partnership.
Partnerships

in

Idaho

are

governed

by

the

Uniform

Partnership Act,

I.C. § 53-3-101 et seq. Under that Act, when property is transferred to the partnership,
it becomes partnership property. See I.C. § 53-3-204. Thus, when Von Zippers and
Small Block contributed parts clearly intended to be used in the motorcycle, those parts

A "person," as defined by Idaho's Uniform Partnership Law, includes not only natural
persons, but also corporations, business trusts, estates, trusts, partnerships, limited
partnerships, associations, joint ventures, limited liability companies, governments,
governmental subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, or any other legal or
commercial entities. I.C. § 53-3-101 (12).
25 If, instead, Von Zippers' and Small Block's relationship was limited to a "single
business enterprise," that relationship would best be described as a joint venture.
Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 356 (2008); Steams v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 285
(1952).
24
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became the property of the partnership; as a result, the finished product-the completed
(or partially completed), motorcycle-was the property of the partnership as well. Cf

Murgoitio v. Murgoitio, 111 Idaho 573, 576 (1986) (holding, under an older version of
the Uniform Partnership Law, that "the ultimate determination of whether an asset is
partnership property depends on the parties' intent").
Under Idaho law, the partnership is an entity unto itself, I.C. § 53-3-201 (a), and
any property of the partnership "is the property of the partnership and not the partners
individually."

I.C. § 53-3-203.

However, because each partner is an agent of

partnership and generally has an equal ability to conduct the business of the partnership
on its behalf, I.C. §§ 53-3-301 & -401 (f), each partner is entitled to "use or possess
partnership property ... on behalf of the partnership." I.C. § 53-3-4-1 (g). In this case,
since the purpose of the partnership to prepare various vehicles for sale (or re-sale) at a
profit, Mr. Maxwell had just as much right to possess and/or sell the motorcycle as did
the Witherspoons. Accordingly, neither the Witherspoons, nor Small Block, had a right
of possession to the motorcycle that was superior to Mr. Maxwell's. As such, neither
the Witherspoons, nor Small Block, was the "owner" of the motorcycle for purposes of
Idaho's theft statute and, therefore, Mr. Maxwell's conviction for grand theft must be
reversed.
b)

Assuming Von Zippers And Small Block Manufactured The
Motorcycle As Part Of A Joint Venture, They Had Equal Rights Of
Possession Of That Motorcycle

"A joint venture is generally a relationship analogous to but not identical with a
partnership .... " Steams v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 285 (1952) (quoted in Costa v.

Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 356 (2008)).

The most important distinction between a

partnership and a joint venture appears to be its scope. Whereas a partnership is an
25

"association of two (2) or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,"
I.C. § 53-3-202(a) (emphasis added), a joint venture "is often described as an
association of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise with the
objective of realizing a profit." Stearns, 72 Idaho at 285 (quoted in Borges, 145 Idaho at
356) (emphasis added).

As noted above, the business relationship between Von

Zippers and Small Block was conceived as an ongoing relationship, consisting of
numerous projects involving all different manner of vehicles.

As such, Mr. Maxwell

asserts that it is best described as a partnership. However, to the extent that this Court
disagrees, or is inclined to treat the motorcycle project as a separate business
relationship, the relationship would then be best described as a joint venture. 26
In a joint venture, the business relationship is "'not an entity separate and apart
from the parties composing it."' Borges, 145 Idaho at 357 (quoting Clawson v. General
Ins. Co. of America, 90 Idaho 424, 431 (1966)). Thus, rather than the business entity

possessing the property of the business, participants in a joint venture share "a joint
property interest in the subject matter of the venture .... " Rhodes, 113 Idaho at 166.
In other words, "[i]t is immaterial whose name the property is acquired in a joint venture,
as one holding title is a trustee for those who are so engaged in the joint venture." Id.

In Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 113 Idaho 162 (1987), the Idaho Supreme Court
identified five characteristics of a joint venture:

26

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

a contribution by the parties of money, property, effort, knowledge,
skill, or other assets to a common undertaking;
a joint property interest in the subject matter of the venture and a
right of mutual control or management of the enterprise;
expectation of profits, or the presence of a venture;
a right to participate in the profits; and
a limitation of the objective to a single undertaking or ad hoc
enterprise.

Id. at 165-66. The Court held that "[a) joint venture is created when" all five
characteristics are present. Id.

26

In this case, where Von Zippers and Small Block built a motorcycle together, both
parties shared an equal property interest in that motorcycle.
Furthermore, just as with a partnership, the participants in a joint venture share
"mutual control or management of the enterprise .... " Id. Accordingly, Mr. Maxwell
contends his right to possess, or even sell, the motorcycle in furtherance of the joint
venture was equal to that of the Witherspoons (Small Block).

Thus, neither the

Witherspoons, nor Small Block, was the "owner" of the motorcycle for purposes of
Idaho's theft statute and, therefore, Mr. Maxwell's conviction for grand theft must be
reversed.
4.

The Witherspoons Were Not "Owners" Of The Motorcycle By Virtue Of
Any Sort Of Security Interest In That Motorcycle

At trial, Mr. Witherspoon testified Mr. Maxwell signed title to the motorcycle over
to the Witherspoons (Tr. Vol. IV, p.18, Ls.3-10; Tr. Vol. VI, p.35, Ls.1-19, p.39, L.21 p.40, L.9), and the Witherspoons eventually took possession of the bike (Tr. Vol. IV,
p.18, L.16 - p.19, L. 19, L.9; Tr. Vol. VI, p.39, Ls.6-20, p.42, Ls.8-22). Mr. Witherspoon
further testified the intent was to have the motorcycle serve as collateral for the $5,000
loan the Witherspoons had made to Mr. Maxwell (see Tr. Vol. IV, p.20, Ls.2-13; Tr. Vol.
VI, p.33, L.10 - p.35, L.19, p.38, Ls.1-17), 27 as well as certain other unspecified
transactions (Tr. Vol. VI, p.43, L.6 - p.44, L.4). However, neither the promissory note

While Mr. Maxwell recognizes that the applicable standard of review requires that the
State's evidence be believed, the reality is that Mr. Witherspoon's claim that the
motorcycle was to have secured the $5,000 loan is highly suspect. The title to the
motorcycle transfer was supposedly transferred sometime around April 30, 2004;
however, the $5,000 loan was not made until more than two weeks later-around
May 17, 2004. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.42, L.8 - p.43, L.4.) It seems highly improbable that
title to the motorcycle was transferred to the Witherspoons in order secure a nonexistent loan.
27
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on that loan, nor the Witherspoons' demand on the note, made any reference to any
motorcycle. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.38, L.22 - p.40, L.5; Ex. F; Ex. U.) Furthermore, at some
point, Mr. Witherspoon returned the motorcycle to Mr. Maxwell because "it still needed a
few things." (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, L.10-p.20, L.7, p.23, L.21-p.23, L.12.)
Idaho law is not entirely clear on the question of whether a creditor in a secured
transaction becomes the "owner" of the collateral (for purposes of Idaho's theft statute)
immediately upon the debtor's default. In State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638 (Ct. App.
1997), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this very issue, ultimately rejecting the
notion that a secured creditor becomes the "owner" of property under the theft statute,
such that the debtor can be charged with a crime immediately upon his breach of
contract.

In Henninger, the defendant breached a secured installment contract for

purchase of an automobile by failing to pay for that automobile. See id. at 639-40. The
Court, in evaluating the language of Idaho's theft statute, declined to interpret sections
18-2402(6) and 18-2403(3) as conferring the status of "owner" upon the secured
creditor. See id. at 641-642. In part, the Court reasoned as follows:
It may be legitimately argued that under this definition [of the term
"owner" in section 18-2402(6)], a party who holds only a security interest
becomes the "owner" of the goods upon the debtor's default because the
default gives the secured party the right of possession superior to that of
the purchaser. We think it unlikely, however, that the Idaho legislature, in
adopting I.C. §§ 18-2402(6) and 18-2403(3), intended to render criminal
the conduct of every person who misses· a payment on a secured credit
purchase and does not immediately comply with a contractual obligation to
relinquish possession of the collateral to the secured seller.

Our conclusion that the legislature did not intend the retention of
collateral after default on a secured obligation to constitute theft by
unauthorized control is also based upon the traditional separation between
criminal law and contract law. Our Supreme Court observed in State v.
Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 50, 501 P.2d 727, 734 (1972), that there has been an
"evolved tradition against enforcing contractual obligations through the
28

criminal law.". . . Without a more explicit expression of intent by the
legislature to abandon this customary separation of criminal law from civil
contract enforcement, we will not conclude that the legislature intended
unauthorized control under I.C. § 18-2403(3) to encompass possession by
a debtor who, by defaulting on a payment, has become contractually
obligated to return the collateral to the creditor, or that the legislature
intended the theft statute to be a mechanism that would aid the
repossession efforts of secured creditors.
Id. at 867-68. Indeed, to construe Idaho's theft statute as allowing criminal prosecution

for a breach of contract (in the absence of a fraud element) would run afoul of Article I,
Section 15 of the Idaho Constitution, which holds that "[t]here shall be no imprisonment
for debt in this state except in cases of fraud." "This provision is intended to prohibit
imprisonment over disputes which are contractual in nature." State v. Owen, 129 Idaho
920, 928 (Ct. App. 1997).

Accordingly, it is Mr. Maxwell's contention that secured

creditors are not "owners" for purposes of Idaho's theft statute.

Thus, even if the

Witherspoons or Small Block had an enforceable security interest in the motorcycle,
Mr. Maxwell could not have been convicted of theft based on his default. 28
However, Mr. Maxwell is not unmindful of the fact that in dicta in State v. Bennett,
supra, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that a retained security interest in delivered

goods "would give the seller a superior possessory right in the property upon the
buyer's default," so as to make the seller the "owner" of the goods for purposes of
Idaho's theft statute. 29 Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280. Assuming that this portion of Bennett

A far more reasonable interpretation of Idaho's theft statute is that the secured
creditor only becomes the "owner" of the collateral upon the debtor's default and the
creditor's valid physical possession of the collateral. Under this interpretation, the
breach of contract itself would not incur criminal penalties, only a subsequent taking of
the collateral from the secured creditor.
29 This portion of Bennett contains no analysis of the language of, or intent behind,
section 18-2402(6), and it makes no mention of the Court of Appeals' Henninger
opinion. See Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280. As noted, it is also dicta because the
Supreme Court that the seller had no enforceable security interest. See id.
28
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overruled Henninger, the State still failed to offer sufficient evidence of theft because
neither the Witherspoons nor Small Block held an enforceable security interest in the
motorcycle.
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (codified at J.C. § 28-9-101 et
seq.), title is irrelevant to the question of whether the Witherspoons or Small Block

retained a security interest in the motorcycle. I.C. § 28-9-202. The standard is whether:
(a)

the collateral [was] in the possession of the secured party pursuant
to agreement ... or the debtor has signed a security agreement
which contains a description of the collateral ... ; and

(b)

value has been given; and

(c)

the debtor has rights in the collateral.

I.C. § 28-9-203(1). Under this standard, it is clear the Witherspoons /Small Block did
not have a security interest in the motorcycle because the State failed to offer sufficient
proof as to part (a) of the test. First, it clear no security agreement was ever entered
containing a description of the collateral. Indeed, as noted, neither the promissory note
for the $5,000 loan, nor the demand for payment on that note, included any reference to
collateral, much less collateral consisting of the motorcycle in question. (Tr. Vol. IV,
p.38, L.22 - p.40, L.5; Ex. F; Ex. U.) Second, although Mr. Witherspoon claimed to
have had possession of the motorcycle for a short period of time, he conceded that he
voluntarily relinquished

possession of the motorcycle to Mr. Maxwell prior to

Mr. Maxwell's default on the $5,000 loan. (Compare Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, L.10 - p.20, L.7
(Mr. Witherspoon testifying he returned the motorcycle to Mr. Maxwell in early June of
2004) and Tr. Vol. IV, p.23, L.21 - p.23, L.12 (Mr. Witherspoon testifying he returned
the motorcycle to Mr. Maxwell in late May or early June of 2004) with Ex F (promissory
note for the $5,000 loan indicating that "[t]his note shall be due on demand, or if no
30

demand is made, one year after the date of making the note") and Ex. U (Witherspoon
Homes' July 13, 2004 demand for payment on the note, giving Mr. Maxwell fifteen days
to make the $5,000 payment). Since the Witherspoons were not in possession of the
alleged collateral, and there was no written agreement describing the collateral, the
Witherspoons had no enforceable security interest in the motorcycle.

I.C. § 28-9-

203(1 ).
D.

Conclusion
Because the State failed to offer substantial, competent evidence establishing

that either the Witherspoons or Small Block was the "owner" of the motorcycle, there is
insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Maxwell's grand theft conviction.

Accordingly,

Mr. Maxwell asks this Court to reverse his conviction.
II.
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Amend The Indictment To Allege
Different Offenses Than Those Considered By The Grand Jury
A.

Introduction
As discussed in detail in the Statement of Facts, the State sought to indict

Mr. Maxwell not only on one count of grand theft, but also on two counts relating to the
alleged defacement, destruction or obliteration of a motorcycle VIN.
Ls.1-9.)

(Tr. Vol. I, p.6,

However, the evidence presented to the grand jury showed only that the

motorcycle's motor number, not its VIN, had been defaced, destroyed or obliterated.
(See Tr. Vol. I, p.75, Ls.7-19, p.76, L.11 - p.78, L.5.)

Nevertheless, the grand jury

indicted Mr. Maxwell on the two counts relating to the alleged defacement, destruction
or obliteration of the VIN. (See R., pp.14-15.)
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As noted, Mr. Maxwell filed a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment based
on insufficient evidence of a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated VIN having been
presented to the grand jury. (R., p.22; see also R., pp.51-59 (memorandum in support
of motion to dismiss).)

In response, the State implicitly conceded the grand jury

testimony supported a finding only that the motor number-not the VIN-was defaced,
destroyed, or obliterated. (See R., pp.93-97.) It then argued that it should be allowed to
amend the indictment-to allege a defaced, destroyed or obliterated motor number
instead of a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated VIN-so that the indictment might
conform to the grand jury testimony.

(R., pp.93-94.) Part of this argument was the

State's contention the different factual allegations would still make out the "same
offenses" under I.C. § 49-1418, the statute under which Mr. Maxwell was originally
charged. (R., p.95.)
Mr. Maxwell objected to any amendment of the indictment, arguing the proposed
amendment violated both Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) and principles of due process, the
amended indictment charged violations of the same statutory provisions as the original
indictment, it actually alleged different offenses because it alleged different operative
facts. (R., pp.122-23; Tr. Vol. II, p.44, Ls.19-25.) Ultimately, although the district court
concluded "[t]he Indictment is clearly wrong" (Tr. Vol. II, p.51, Ls.14-15), it ruled the
different acts alleged in the State's proposed amended indictment would not charge a
different offense, therefore, the district court found the amendment was permissible and
granted the State leave to file the amended indictment. (Tr. Vol. II, p.49, L.21 - p.52,
L.9.) On March 24, 2006, the State filed its Second Amended Indictment asserting two
counts relating to the defacement, destruction, or obliteration of a motor number, as
opposed to a VIN. (R., pp.128-30.)
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Subsequently, Mr. Maxwell filed a motion to dismiss the amended indictment on
the basis that the indictment was inadequate under both the Idaho and United States
Constitutions because, in Counts II & Ill (the two counts concerning the alleged
defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the motor number), it alleged different crimes
than those that had been passed upon by the grand jury.

(R., pp.168, 170-75.)

Specifically, he argued the facts alleged in the original charging document, not the
designation of the offense, define the crime and, therefore, when the State amended the
indictment to allege different operative facts, even though the State continued to allege
violations of the same statutory provisions, it nevertheless charged different offenses.
(R., pp.173-74.)
On March 20, 2007, the district court denied Mr. Maxwell's motion. (R., pp.21516.) It reasoned that Mr. Maxwell's arguments had already been rejected; his motion
was untimely under Idaho Criminal Rule 12; and, under Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e), the
motion was "without substantive merit because no new offense is charged [in the
Second Amended Indictment] and the defendant has not shown any prejudice."
(R., pp.215-16.)
Mr. Maxwell submits that the district court erred in allowing the State to amend
the indictment in the first place.

Because the amended indictment alleged different

criminal acts, it alleged different offenses.

Thus, amendment was not only improper

under I.C.R. 7(e), but it violated Mr. Maxwell's right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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B.

The Amended Indictment Charged Different Offenses Than Those Considered
By The Grand Jury
The original indictment handed down by the grand jury alleged two crimes related

to the defacement, destruction, or obliteration of a motorcycle VIN.

(R., pp.13-15.)

Count II alleged that Mr. Maxwell "did deface and/or destroy and/or obliterate a motor

vehicle identification number on a 2003 Renegade custom motorcycle vehicle
identification number 1V9HC26573C 109012, by grinding,

sanding,

or otherwise

removing the vehicle identification," in violation of I.C. § 49-1418 (3).

(R., pp.13-14

(emphasis added).) Count Ill alleged that Mr. Maxwell "did knowingly dispose of and/or
sell and/or offer for sale a 2003 Renegade custom motorcycle from which the vehicle

identification number had been defaced and/or destroyed and/or obliterated," in violation
of I.C. § 49-1418(4). (R., pp.13-15 (emphasis added).) As noted, it is undisputed that
the vehicle identification number is the serial number appearing on the frame of the
motorcycle.

(See Tr. Vol. I, p.72, L.17 - p.73, L.10 (Patricia Redel's grand jury

testimony); Tr. Vol. VI, p.235, L.25 - p.237, L.3 (Ms. Redel's trial testimony).)
The amended indictment, in contrast, alleged two crimes related to the
defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the motorcycle's motor number.

Count II

alleged Mr. Maxwell "did deface and/or destroy, a motor number, manufacturer's
number, or parts number, on a motor or engine of a 2003 custom motorcycle," in
violation of I.C. § 49-1418 (3).

(R., pp.128-29.)

Count Ill alleged Mr. Maxwell "did

knowingly dispose of, and/or sell, and/or offer for sale, a Renegade custom motorcycle
from which the motor or engine number had been defaced, and/or destroyed, and or
obliterated," in violation of I.C. § 49-1418(4).

(R., pp.128-30.)

Obviously, a motor

number appears on the motor (engine) of a motorcycle, not the frame.
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Although the acts alleged in Count II of the original indictment (defacing,
destroying, or obliterating a VIN) versus Count II of the amended indictment (defacing,
destroying, or obliterating a motor number), and the acts alleged in Count Ill of the
original indictment (disposing of, selling, or offering for sale a motorcycle whose VIN has
been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated) versus Count Ill of the amended indictment
(disposing of, selling, or offering for sale a motorcycle whose motor number has been
defaced, destroyed, or obliterated), are made criminal by the same subsections
(subsections (3) and (4), respectively) of I.C. § 49-1418, the acts themselves define the
crime charged, not the designation of the offense or the statute cited.
In State v. Mickey, 27 Idaho 626, 150 P. 39 (1915), the earliest reported case on
this subject, the Supreme Court held that where the charging document alleged all of
the pertinent facts which, if proven, would satisfy the elements of involuntary
manslaughter, it did not matter that the State had failed to specifically allege the
defendant had committed "involuntary manslaughter."

Id. at_, 150 P. at 40. The

Supreme Court reasoned that "(t]he facts alleged, rather than the designation of the
offense, control." Id.
The reasoning of Mickey has withstood the test of time. ln 1967, the Supreme
Court followed Mickey in holding it was permissible for the State to amend a charging
document (that had initially identified the offense as aggravated assault) to reflect a
greater charge (aggravated battery) because the acts alleged had not changed.
State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 817-18 (1967). More recently, in 1990, the Supreme

Court applied the standard articulated in Mickey and McKeehan in holding that a
charging document could be amended to allege sexual abuse of a minor, instead of
lewd conduct with a minor, in part, because "(t]he acts comprising a violation of I.C. §
35

18-1506 [lewd conduct] as set forth and alleged in the Amended Information are the
same acts with which O'Neill was charged in the original Complaint and original
Information alleging violation of I.C. § 18-1508 [sexual abuse]." State v. O'Neill, 118
Idaho 244, 249 (1990).
In view of these authorities, it is readily apparent that Counts II and Ill of the
amended indictment in this case charged different offenses than Counts II and Ill of the
original indictment because they alleged different criminal acts. 30
C.

Because The Amended Indictment Charged Different Offenses Than Had Been
Considered By The Grand Jury, The State Had No Ability To Proceed On That
Amended Indictment And Mr. Maxwell's Convictions On Counts II And Ill Must
Be Vacated
Because the original indictment in this case was amended to allege different

offenses (in Counts II & Ill) than had been considered by the grand jury, the amendment
was improper under both the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.

See

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009) ("Because the amended indictment did

not charge Severson with a new offense or result in prejudice, the amendment was
permissible under principles of due process and Rule 7(e)."); I.C.R. 7(e) ("The court

This is not a case where the amendment to the charging document changed only the
manner or means by which the criminal act was alleged to have been done-for
example, where the charging document is amended to allege "statutory" rape, instead of
forcible rape, against the same victim. In that instance, it has been held that the
amendment goes not to the act alleged (nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a
specified victim), but to the "circumstances" under which the act was allegedly
undertaken. See State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1987). In this case, the act
alleged differed between the original indictment and the amended indictment. In the
former case, Mr. Maxwell was alleged to have defaced, destroyed, or obliterated a VIN,
and in the latter case, Mr. Maxwell was alleged to have defaced, destroyed, or
obliterated a motor number. Analogizing this case to the rape example, it is as if the
charging document were amended to allege the rape of a different victim. Surely that
would be an allegation of a different offense.
30
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may permit a complaint, an information or indictment to be amended at any time before
the prosecution rests if no additional or different offense is charged .... "). 31
As noted, when the State moved to amend the indictment, Mr. Maxwell objected
to any amendment, citing I.C.R. 7(e) and his right to due process, and arguing the
State's proffered amendment would charge different offenses than those considered by
the grand jury.

(R., p.123; Tr. Vol. II, p.42, L.13 - p.48, L.13, p.51, Ls.20-24.)

The

district court overruled that objection and allowed the State to file its amended
indictment. (Tr. Vol. II, p.49, L.21 - p.52, L.9.) This was error.
First, while Rule 7(e) is, in many ways, quite liberal in allowing the district court to
grant leave for the State to amend a charging document, it articulates two situations in
which amendment is expressly disallowed: (a) where the amendment will prejudice the
defendant; and (b) where the amendment would charge an "additional or different
offense." I.C.R. 7(e). Furthermore, it is now reasonably clear that an amendment which
prejudices the defendant or charges and additional or different offense runs afoul of the
due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Severson, 147 Idaho at

710. Second, for the reasons discussed in Part 11(8) (and incorporated herein by this

Although Article I Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution was not explicitly mentioned in
Mr. Maxwell's initial objection to the State's request to amend the indictment, it is clear
that Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) is intended to give effect to the rights guaranteed therein.
See State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 30 (Ct. App. 2009). Article I Section 8 guarantees,
inter a/ia, that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of
any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on information of the
public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate," IDAHO CONST. art. 1 § 8, and the
standard for finding a violation of this right to a grand jury proceeding or preliminary
hearing based on an improper amendment of the indictment or information is the same
standard as for finding a violation of Rule 7(e). See McKeehan, 91 Idaho at 817 ("An
accused is denied ... his constitutional right to a preliminary hearing [under Article I
Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution] where an information is filed or subsequently
amended charging him with a crime of a greater degree or of a different nature than that
for which he was held by the committing magistrate.").
31
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reference), it is clear the State's amended indictment charged different offenses than
those considered by the grand jury.
In light of the foregoing, it was error for the district court to have allowed the
amendment. See I.C.R. 7(e); Severson, 147 Idaho at 710. As a result, Mr. Maxwell's
convictions on Counts II and Ill should be vacated, and this Court should remand his
case with an instruction that Counts II and Ill be dismissed.

111.
The District Court Erred In Its Computation Of The Restitution Owed To National
Indemnity
A.

Introduction
In Part I, supra, Mr. Maxwell argued that the State presented insufficient

evidence to support his grand theft conviction and, therefore, that conviction must be
reversed.

Assuming this Court agrees, it should also vacate the restitution awards

arising out of Mr. Maxwell's alleged theft of the motorcycle-$500 for the Witherspoons
and $15,044.11 for National Indemnity.
In the event this Court finds sufficient evidence to affirm his grand theft
conviction, Mr. Maxwell presents an alternative argument. He asserts the district court
erred in its computation of the restitution owed to National Indemnity based on the theft
of the motorcycle. Specifically, Mr. Maxwell contends that the $15,044.11 restitution
award was incorrect because it included a $5,000 loss that was in no way attributable to
Mr. Maxwell's criminal conduct.
B.

Applicable Legal Standards
"A criminal trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction or authority to order

restitution unless provided by statute." State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 760 (Ct. App.
2010).

Idaho law, however, generally provides such jurisdiction/authority.
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A district

court may, in a criminal case, "order a defendant found guilty of any crime which
results 32 in an economic loss 33 to the victim 34 to make restitution to the victim."
I.C. § 19-5304 (2).
The question of whether restitution is warranted lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court. State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 942 (Ct. App. 1997). The district
court's determination of whether to order restitution in a particular case is reviewed by
the appellate court for an abuse of discretion. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37
(Ct. App. 2002).

As with all exercises of the district court's discretion, the court's

decision to award restitution must be made through an exercise of reason and, further,
must be consistent with any applicable legal standards. Id.
"The court, in determining ... the amount of such restitution, shall consider the
amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial
resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the
court deems appropriate."

I.C. § 19-5304 (7).

Economic loss must be proved by a

preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-5304(6). The amount of economic loss is a
question of fact for the district court, and it will not be disturbed on appeal if it is

In State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602-06, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear
the inquiry is whether the defendant's criminal conduct was both the actual cause, as
well as the proximate cause, of the economic loss suffered.
33 '"Economic loss' includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed,
broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses,
such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct, but does not include less
tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress."
I.C. § 19-5304 (1 )(a).
34 A "victim" is defined to include "[t]he directly injured victim which means a person or
entity who suffers economic loss or injury as a result of the defendant's criminal
conduct," as well as "[a] person or entity who suffers economic loss because such
person or entity has made payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim pursuant
to a contract including, but not limited to, an insurance contract .... " I.C. § 19-5304
(1)(e). Mr. Maxwell concedes that National Indemnity is a "victim" within the meaning of
1.C. § 19-5304(2).
32
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supported by substantial evidence. State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 544 (Ct. App. 1989).
Otherwise, the restitution amount lies within the discretion of the district court. State v.
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, _, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011 ).

As noted, in order to not

constitute an abuse of discretion, the district court's restitution decision must be made
through an exercise of reason and must be consistent with any applicable legal
standards. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37.
C.

The Restitution Award For National Indemnity Was Calculated Incorrectly
National Indemnity Company, the insurance company through which Small Block

had insured the motorcycle at issue in this case, paid the Witherspoons $15,044.11 for
their purported loss of that motorcycle.

(Affidavit of Scott Kepler in Support of

Restitution, p.2 & ex.9.) Thus, National Indemnity sought restitution in that amount.
(See 2006 PSI addendum, pp.9-11; 2007 PSI addendum, pp.9-11.)
This amount was calculated based on Mrs. Witherspoon's representations as to
what Small Block had paid toward completion of the motorcycle.

(Affidavit of Scott

Kepler in Support of Restitution, pp.2-3; Tr. Vol. VIII, p.62, Ls.7-18 (testimony of Diana
Witherspoon), p.67, L.5 - p.68, L.8 (testimony of Bruce Mountjoy, the insurance
adjuster hired by National Indemnity).)

Mrs. Witherspoon itemized Small Block's

expenses as follows:
Von Zippers (labor) 35

$5,000.00

Shumate Motorsports (Harley Davidson Motor)

$3,541.40

Ted's Cycle (unspecified parts)

$590.82

Lawrence's Motorcycles (unspecified parts)

$209.10

After Mr. Maxwell's trial, wherein Mr. Witherspoon had made it clear that the $5,000
payment made to Mr. Maxwell had been a loan independent of any agreement
regarding the motorcycle, Mrs. Witherspoon again tried to characterize that payment as
compensation for the labor he put into the motorcycle. (See Tr. Vol. VIII, p.62, Ls.1923.)
35

40

Ted's Cycle (unspecified parts)

$2,342.89

Idaho Independent Bank (cost of cashier's check
provided to Ted's Cycles)

$5.00

Idaho Department of Transportation (sales tax and fees)

$463.00

Unidentified Vendor(s) (miscellaneous parts)

$3,387.00

Total

$15,539.21 36

(Affidavit of Scott Kepler in Support of Restitution, pp.2-3 & exs.1-9; Tr. Vol. VIII, p.62,
Ls. 7-18 (testimony of Diana Witherspoon), p.67, L.5 - p.68, L.8 (testimony of Bruce
Mountjoy, the insurance adjuster hired by National Indemnity).)
Ultimately, the district court granted National Indemnity's full restitution request.
("Amended" Order to Pay Restitution as a Condition of Probation (Jan. 27, 2011 );
"Amended" Civil Judgment (Jan. 27, 2011 ); Tr. Vol. VIII, p.94, Ls.6-11.)
Mr. Maxwell submits the sum awarded to National Indemnity for restitution
($15,044.11) was erroneously calculated. Although this is almost certainly the amount
National Indemnity paid to its insured, Small Block, the fact is because of
Mrs. Witherspoon's misrepresentations, National Indemnity overpaid Small Block by
$5,000-the that Mrs. Witherspoon claimed was paid to Mr. Maxwell for his labor. As
set forth above (see Statement of Facts and Part I, supra), the trial evidence makes it
patently clear Small Block never paid Mr. Maxwell $5,000 for his work on the
motorcycle; Small Block and Von Zippers were partners (or joint venturers) on the
motorcycle project (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-8, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.23, Ls.5-15) and, more
importantly for purposes of the restitution issue, the $5,000 paid to Mr. Maxwell was a
separate loan from Witherspoon Homes to Von Zippers (Tr. Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 - p.15,
L.4, p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.1; Tr. Vol. VI, p.44, Ls.22-24).

36

Accordingly, the $5,000

This total, minus Small Block's $500 deductible, nearly matches the $15,044.11 paid
to Small Block by National Indemnity.
41

payment to Mr. Maxwell is not an economic loss caused by Mr. Maxwell's criminal
conduct in this case.

See State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho at, 602-06 (2011).

As such,

restitution for this amount was impermissible under I.C. § 19-5304, and, therefore, this
Court should reduce National Indemnity's restitution award by $5,000.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Maxwell respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his convictions and sentences and order an acquittal on the grand theft charge
and a dismissal of the other two charges. Alternatively, he requests that the restitution
amount awarded to National Indemnity Company be reduced by $5,000.
DATED this 5th day of July, 2011.
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